

Kriptografi Atasi Zarah Key Agreement (KAZ-KA)

Algorithm Specifications and Supporting Documentation

(KAZ-KA 1.0)

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Name of the proposed cryptosystem: KAZ-KA 1.0

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1. INTRODUCTION

The proposed KAZ Key Agreement scheme, KAZ-KA (in Malay *Kriptografi Atasi Zarah* - translated literally “cryptographic techniques overcoming particles”; particles here referring to the photons) is built upon the hard mathematical problem coined as the Double Discrete Logarithm Problem (DDLp) and Hidden Number Problem (HNP). The target of the KAZ-KA design is to be a quantum resistant key agreement candidate with short parameters, executing correctly 100% of the time, based on simple mathematics, having fast execution time and a potential candidate for seamless drop-in replacement in current cryptographic software and hardware ecosystems.

2. THE DESIGN IDEALISME

- (i) To be based upon a problem that could be proven analytically to require exponential time to be solved;
- (ii) To be able to prove analytically that the cryptosystem is indeed resistant towards quantum computers;
- (iii) To utilize problems mentioned in point (i) above in its full spectrum without having to induce “weaknesses” in order for a trapdoor to be constructed;
- (iv) To use “simple” mathematics in order to achieve maximum simplicity in design, such that even practitioners with limited mathematical background will be able to understand the arithmetic;
- (v) Achieve 128 and 256-bit security with key length roughly equivalent to the non-quantum secure Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC);
- (vi) To achieve maximum speed upon having simplicity in design and short key length;
- (vii) To have a sufficiently large plaintext-ciphertext space;
- (viii) The computation overhead for both encapsulation and decapsulation increases slightly even if the key size increases in the future;
- (ix) To be able to be mounted on hardware with ease;
- (x) The plaintext to ciphertext expansion ratio is kept to a minimum.

One of our key strategy to obtain items (i) - (v) was by utilizing our defined Double Discrete Logarithm Problem (DDLp) and Hidden Number Problem (HNP). It is defined in the following section.

3. THE DOUBLE DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM (DDLDP)

Let $N = \prod_{i=1}^j p_i$ be a public modulus. Choose random primes (g_1, g_2) where $\text{DLog}_{g_1}(g_2)$ and $\text{DLog}_{g_2}(g_1)$ modulo N does not exist. Let O_{g_1N} be the order of g_1 in \mathbb{Z}_N . Let O_{g_2N} be the order of g_2 in \mathbb{Z}_N . Compute $A \equiv g_1^s g_2^t \pmod{N}$ for some $s \in \mathbb{Z}_{O_{g_1N}}$ and $t \in \mathbb{Z}_{O_{g_2N}}$. The DDLDP is, upon given the parameters (A, g_1, g_2, N) , one is tasked to identify the pair (s, t) .

4. UNIQUENESS

Assume there exists (α, β) such that $g_1^s g_2^t \equiv g_1^\alpha g_2^\beta \pmod{N}$. We will have,

$$g_1^{s-\alpha} \equiv g_2^{\beta-t} \pmod{N}$$

Which implies either,

$$g_1 \equiv g_2^{\zeta_1} \pmod{N}$$

or

$$g_2 \equiv g_1^{\zeta_2} \pmod{N}$$

for some $\zeta_1, \zeta_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}$. This is false, since we have chosen random primes (g_1, g_2) where $\text{DLog}_{g_1}(g_2)$ and $\text{DLog}_{g_2}(g_1)$ modulo N does not exist.

5. COMPLEXITY OF SOLVING THE DDLDP

The complexity to obtain s is $O(s)$. Due to the strategies during key generation, we have the complexity $O(s) > O(2^k)$ where k is the chosen security level, either 128, 192 or 256. When deploying Grover's algorithm on a quantum computer, the complexity to obtain s is $O(2^{\frac{k}{2}})$.

6. THE HIDDEN NUMBER PROBLEM (HNP) (Boneh and Venkatesan, 2001)

Fix p and u . Let $O_{\alpha,g}(x)$ be an oracle that upon input x computes the most u significant bits of $\alpha g^x \pmod{p}$. The task is to compute the hidden number $\alpha \pmod{p}$ in expected polynomial time when one is given access to the oracle $O_{\alpha,g}(x)$. Clearly, one wishes to solve the problem with as small u as possible. Boneh and Venkatesan (2001) demonstrated that a bounded number of most significant bits of a shared secret are as hard to compute as the entire secret itself.

The initial idea of introducing the HNP is to show that finding the u most significant bits of the shared key in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using users public key is equivalent to computing the entire shared secret key itself.

7. COMPLEXITY OF SOLVING THE HNP

The complexity to obtain $\alpha \pmod{p}$ is $O(p)$. When deploying Grover's algorithm on a quantum computer, the complexity to obtain $\alpha \pmod{p}$ is $O(p^{\frac{1}{2}})$.

8. THE KAZ-KA KEY AGREEMENT ALGORITHM

8.1 Background

This section discusses the construction of the KAZ-KA scheme. We provide information regarding the partial key agreement generation and full key agreement generation procedures. But first, we will put forward functions that we will utilize and the system parameters for all users.

8.2 Utilized Functions

Let $\ell(\cdot)$ be the function that outputs the bit length of a given input. Let $\text{DLog}_u(v)$ modulo p be the function that outputs w such that $v \equiv u^w \pmod{p}$.

8.3 System Parameters

From the given security parameter k (either 128, 192 or 256; depending on the security level needed), prepare a list of the first j -primes larger than 2, $P = \{p_i\}_{i=1}^j$ (as of printing it is suggested $j = 65, 96, 122$). Let $N = \prod_{i=1}^j p_i$ be a public modulus. Choose random primes (g_1, g_2) where $\text{DLog}_{g_1}(g_2)$ and $\text{DLog}_{g_2}(g_1)$ modulo N does not exist. Let O_{g_1N} be the order of g_1 in \mathbb{Z}_N . Let O_{g_2N} be the order of g_2 in \mathbb{Z}_N . The system parameters are $(g_1, g_2, O_{g_1N}, O_{g_2N}, N)$.

8.4 KAZ-KA Algorithms

The full algorithms of KAZ-KA are shown in Algorithms 1, 2, and 3.

Algorithm 1 KAZ-KA Partial Key Agreement Generation Algorithm by party A

Input: System parameters $(g_1, g_2, O_{g_1N}, O_{g_2N}, N)$.

Output: Partial key, (A_1, A_2) and secret key pair, (a_1, a_2) .

- 1: Choose random ephemeral $a_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{O_{g_1N}}$ and $a_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{O_{g_2N}}$
 - 2: Compute $A_1 \equiv g_1^{a_1} g_2^{2a_2} \pmod{N}$.
 - 3: Compute $A_2 \equiv g_1^{a_2} g_2^{a_1} \pmod{N}$.
 - 4: Output partial key (A_1, A_2) to party B and keep key pair (a_1, a_2) .
-

Algorithm 2 KAZ-KA Partial Key Agreement Generation Algorithm by party **B**

Input: System parameters $(g_1, g_2, O_{g_1N}, O_{g_2N}, N)$.

Output: Partial key, (B_1, B_2) and secret key pair, (b_1, b_2) .

- 1: Choose random ephemeral $b_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{O_{g_1N}}$ and $b_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{O_{g_2N}}$.
 - 2: Compute $B_1 \equiv g_1^{b_1} g_2^{b_2} \pmod{N}$.
 - 3: Compute $B_2 \equiv g_1^{b_2} g_2^{2b_1} \pmod{N}$.
 - 4: Output partial key (B_1, B_2) to party **A** and keep key pair (b_1, b_2) .
-

Algorithm 3 KAZ-KA Full Key Agreement Generation by party **A** and **B**

Input: Partial key (A_1, A_2) and (B_1, B_2) .

Output: Shared key K_A and K_B .

- 1: Party **A** computes $K_A \equiv B_1^{a_1} B_2^{a_2} \pmod{N}$.
 - 2: Party **B** computes $K_B \equiv A_1^{b_1} A_2^{b_2} \pmod{N}$.
 - 3: Output K_A and K_B , where $K_A = K_B$.
-

9. PROOF OF CORRECTNESS

Observe the following,

$$\begin{aligned} K_A &\equiv B_1^{a_1} B_2^{a_2} \\ &\equiv g_1^{b_1 a_1} g_2^{b_2 a_1} g_1^{b_2 a_2} g_2^{2b_1 a_2} \\ &\equiv g_1^{a_1 b_1} g_2^{2a_2 b_1} g_1^{a_2 b_2} g_2^{a_1 b_2} \\ &\equiv A_1^{b_1} A_2^{b_2} \\ &\equiv K_B \pmod{N} \end{aligned}$$

10. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOUBLE DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM (DDL P)

It is clear that the following parameters are implementing the DDL P:

1. $A_1 \equiv g_1^{a_1} g_2^{2a_2} \pmod{N}$
2. $A_2 \equiv g_1^{a_2} g_2^{a_1} \pmod{N}$
3. $B_1 \equiv g_1^{b_1} g_2^{b_2} \pmod{N}$
4. $B_2 \equiv g_1^{b_2} g_2^{2b_1} \pmod{N}$

11. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HIDDEN NUMBER PROBLEM (HNP)

It is clear that the following parameters are implementing the HNP:

1. $A_1 \equiv g_1^{a_1} g_2^{2a_2} \equiv x_1 g_2^{2a_2} \pmod{N}$, where $x_1 \equiv g_1^{a_1} \pmod{N}$
2. $A_2 \equiv g_1^{a_2} g_2^{a_1} \equiv x_2 g_2^{a_1} \pmod{N}$, where $x_2 \equiv g_1^{a_2} \pmod{N}$
3. $B_1 \equiv g_1^{b_1} g_2^{b_2} \equiv x_3 g_2^{b_2} \pmod{N}$, where $x_3 \equiv g_1^{b_1} \pmod{N}$
4. $B_2 \equiv g_1^{b_2} g_2^{2b_1} \equiv x_4 g_2^{2b_1} \pmod{N}$, where $x_4 \equiv g_1^{b_2} \pmod{N}$

12. DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM ANALYSIS

Since $\text{DLog}_{g_1}(g_2)$ and $\text{DLog}_{g_2}(g_1)$ modulo N does not exist, an immediate DLP scenario does not occur with the equations (A_1, A_2, B_1, B_2) . However, assume that h is a primitive root in \mathbb{Z}_N where N is either 1, 2, 4, p^k , or $2p^k$ where p is an odd prime number and k is a positive integer such that we have $h^{z_1} \equiv g_1 \pmod{N}$ and $h^{z_2} \equiv g_2 \pmod{N}$. One would now have the following equations:

$$A_1 \equiv h^{z_1 a_1 + 2z_2 a_2} \pmod{N} \quad (1)$$

$$A_2 \equiv h^{z_1 a_2 + z_2 a_1} \pmod{N} \quad (2)$$

Upon multiplying z_2 on the DLP solution for (2) and z_1 on the DLP solution for (3), one could proceed to obtain

$$2z_2^2 a_2 - z_1^2 a_2 \equiv (2z_2^2 - z_1^2) a_2 \pmod{\phi(N)} \quad (3)$$

Assuming $\gcd(2z_2^2 - z_1^2, \phi(N)) = 1$ one would obtain a_2 . Thus, the existence of such primitive root $h \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ is the key towards the above cryptanalysis direction. However the parameter of N in KAZ-KA does not subscribe to either 1, 2, 4, p^k , or $2p^k$ where p is an odd prime number and k is a positive integer.

13. DERIVING THE SECURITY LEVEL OF KAZ-KA

The challenge faced by the adversary is to retrieve (a_1, a_2) from (A_1, A_2) . It is protected by the DDLP and HNP.

Due to the strategies during key generation, we have the complexity $O(a_1) > O(2^k)$ where k is the chosen security level, either 128, 192 or 256. When deploying Grover's algorithm on a quantum computer, the complexity to obtain a_1 is greater than $O(2^{\frac{k}{2}})$.

14. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE

14.1 Partial and Full Key Generation Time Complexity

It is obvious that the time complexity for all three procedures is in polynomial time.

14.2 Parameter sizes

We will utilize $g_1 = 65563$ and $g_2 = 65617$.

NIST Security Level	Security level, k	Number of primes in list P , j	Order (O_{g_1N}, O_{g_2N}) size (bits)	Public key size (A_1, A_2) (bits)	Private Key Size, (a_1, a_2) (bits)
1	128	65	$\approx (128, 128)$	$2 \times 432 = 864$	256
3	192	96	$\approx (192, 192)$	$2 \times 702 = 1,404$	384
5	256	122	$\approx (256, 256)$	$2 \times 942 = 1,884$	512

Table 1

14.3 Partial and Full Key Generation Ease of Implementation

The algebraic structure of KAZ-KA has an abundance of programming libraries available to be utilized. Among them are:

1. GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library (GMP); and
2. Standard C libraries.

14.4 Partial and Full Key Generation Empirical Performance Data

In order to obtain benchmarks, we evaluate our reference implementation on a machine using GCC Compiler Version 6.3.0 (MinGW.org GCC-6.3.0-1) on Windows 10 Pro, Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4710HQ CPU @ 2.50GHz and 8.00 GB RAM (64-bit operating system, x64-based processor).

We have the following empirical results when Party **A** and **B** conducts 100 parital key generations independently, 100 full key generations by Party **A** and **B**:

Security level	Time (ms)		
	Partial Key Generation	Party A	Party B
128 KAZKA01	60	2	2
192 KAZKA03	68	7	7
256 KAZKA05	83	15	15

Table 2

15. ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS

As we have seen, KAZ-KA can be evaluated through:

1. Key length
2. Speed
3. No full key generation failure

15.1 Key Length

KAZ-KA key length is comparable to non-post quantum algorithms such as ECC and RSA. For 256-bit security, the KAZ-KA key size is 1,884-bits. ECC would use 521-bit keys and RSA would use 15,360-bit keys.

15.2 Speed

KAZ-KA's speed analysis results stem from the fact that it has short key length to achieve 256-bit security plus its textbook complexity running time for both encapsulation and de-capsulation is $O(n^3)$ where parameter n here is the input length.

15.3 No Full Key Generation Failure

From the proof of correctness, the probability of full key generation failure is 0.

15.4 Limitation

As we have seen, limitation of KAZ-KA can be evaluated through:

1. Based on not widely used problems, the Double Discrete Logarithm Problem (DDLDP) and Hidden Number Problem (HNP).

15.4.1 Based on not widely used problems, Double Discrete Logarithm Problem (DDLDP) and Hidden Number Problem (HNP)

The DDLDP and HNP are not known hard mathematical problems which are quantum resistant and are subject to future cryptanalysis success in solving the defined challenge either with a classical or quantum computer.

16. CLOSING REMARKS

The KAZ-KA partial and full key generation mechanism exhibits properties that might result in it being a desirable post quantum key agreement mechanism scheme.

To this end, the security is based on the DDLDP and HNP, which are not a widely used problems. We opine that, the acceptance of DDLDP and HNP as potential quantum resistant hard mathematical problems will come hand in hand with a secure cryptosystem designed upon it. We welcome all comments on the KAZ-KA key agreement mechanism, either findings that nullify its suitability as a post quantum key agreement mechanism scheme or findings that could enhance its deployment and use case in the future.

17. ILLUSTRATIVE FULL SIZE TEST VECTORS

The following are parameters that illustrate KAZ-KA for 256-bit security.

System Parameters

N :

294218183941473459350361361353913759940241264053255766722273980374935594520081162
835947090690978803191179463432813576314475560419038845862081616787105974697279997
461798630453885591474074570682758159149149838963927578786839191890758982695509398
68181179868469970964809582599153788719655

g_1 :

65563

g_2 :

65617

O_{g_1N} :

99154693887499828557116081873795155652147461554242228686027806044656980768000 $\approx 2^{256}$

O_{g_2N} :

297464081662499485671348245621385466956442384662726686058083418133970942304000 $\approx 2^{258}$

Partial and Full Key Generation by Party A

a_1 :

106732665057690615308701680462846682779480968671143352109289849544853387479432 $\approx 2^{256}$

a_2 :

323977999869557469144432644564867070808648082655844398809350209560252032063067 $\approx 2^{258}$

A_1 :

2233544582721045676693011394549873787904012851535551527301434103341770697560585094
5603279213861038061473547836662152156897582176161121337100328029338821477826864792
3029668381669914707000451938708095286393035451418857974283477712622569010106771729
83145211500943055751567609604862790584

A_2 :

4135616808611205881148255230294436189247413503530220847281193647638518401538759923
1425122373020822819983892047637816038594393882508743390176001914833826162164971819
4469580842084651667854070821842231206950576819567963832750950246366015677565947284
7883203846070704631177532370571404972

$B_1^{a_1} B_2^{a_2} \pmod{N}$:

2839049513089992979523652326478572339862829163948821263717471002635385021662072
3204951988974462856799751398539433923678244887018338734726974637949968033361690
0059817411671705327547919119560538371544241635372051438389954727571197832204568
53471592961960916269366312661171237372284085293

(4)

Partial and Full Key Generation by Party B

$b_1 :$

104066810900827461749919062303612358728884553709626539777574910471434356483636 $\approx 2^{256}$

$b_2 :$

248850397338699573933677633053195073562613307128507861912091178164029894782579 $\approx 2^{258}$

$B_1 :$

223825736993560944132345979730565432058984068600004548050567783316925477566596
1587539967630463605399357436041575972435686611108191252847835915953890505769428
1809185509866293571698026166515243079364633439848615216399768397265290249941656
065475013787232567503576826032663722628368318488

$B_2 :$

2013353913179063411985909378891799706527108509807100232786670501999754915172004
4448645543616500739725578538358097804071979410094932239288165083346508333084956
4731760823860952586714707128231556281484155300119911208568579376312883639210770
7243323256594800509549400217551725685727971102

$A_1^{b_1} A_2^{b_2} \pmod{N} :$

2839049513089992979523652326478572339862829163948821263717471002635385021662072
3204951988974462856799751398539433923678244887018338734726974637949968033361690
0059817411671705327547919119560538371544241635372051438389954727571197832204568
53471592961960916269366312661171237372284085293

(5)

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